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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of metamemory, which generally refers to 
one's knowledge and awareness of memory (Flavell & Wellman, 
1977; see also, Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982), first developed 
in the early 1960s, and has continued unabated. In that 
early period, Hart (1965, 1966, 1967) conducted research on 
the feeling-of-knowing phenomenon, a frequently studied 
topic of metamemory. However, it was not until two 
influential publications in 1970 that the field of 
metamemory clearly began to evolve. The first was an annual 
review article written by Tulving and Madigan (1970) and the 
second was a chapter written by Flavell (1970). 
In their 1970 review article, Tulving and Madigan 
discussed the division between researchers of verbal 
learning and researchers of memory. Despite having the 
common goal of understanding how people learn and remember, 
researchers of verbal learning and researchers of memory, 
according to Tulving and Madigan, tended to ask different 
questions, employed different methods, and used different 
terminology. Researchers of verbal learning investigated 
specific questions about learning through controlled 
experimentation with carefully paced conditions and.multiple 
study trials; whereas, researchers of memory examined 
questions concerning information-processing models by using 
some methods similar to and some methods different from 
verbal learning research (see also Keppel, 1968). Tulving 
and Madigan then proceeded to declare that the field of 
verbal learning and memory had made only minimal progress 
within the last century, and they forwarded the suggestion 
that if there was ever to be a genuine breakthrough in the 
psychological study of memory, " ... it will, among other 
things, relate the knowledge stored in an individual's 
memory to his knowledge of that knowledge" (p.477). 
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Also in 1970, Flavell, a developmental psychologist, 
coined the term metacognition, meaning essentially cognition 
about cognition. Metamemory has been classified as a 
subcategory of metacognition (Brown, 1978), and has been 
defined as an individual's knowledge or cognition about 
anything pertaining to memory (Flavell, 1985). Adult 
metamemory research and developmental metamemory research 
have continued to beneficially influence one another. In 
particular, developmental metamemory researchers such as 
Flavell and Brown have influenced adult metamemory research 
theory and terminology. 
Flavell (1979) later conceptualized two key components 
of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive 
experiences. Metacognitive knowledge refers to knowledge or 
beliefs about what factors act and interact to affect the 
course and outcome of cognition. He categorized this 
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knowledge into person knowledge, task knowledge, and 
strategy knowledge. With respect to metamemory, person 
knowledge encompasses everything a person knows about the 
memory of other people as well as what he/she knows about 
his/her own memory. Task knowledge refers to what a person 
knows about memory in relation to specific tasks, and 
strategy knowledge is all information pertaining to the 
effectiveness of various methods of learning. Flavell 
emphasized that most metacognitive knowledge involves 
interactions or combinations among two or three of these 
types of knowledge. For example, you might believe that you 
(unlike someone you know) should use a particular strategy 
(as opposed to a second strategy) for a certain task (as 
contrasted with a different task) . 
Flavell (1979) introduced the term "metacognitive 
experiences" to refer to occasions during cognitive 
processing when new insights about cognition arise (cf. 
Schneider & Pressley, 1989). An example may help clarify 
the concept. An individual learning a list of items may 
experience a momentary feeling that he or she is not going 
to remember a number of the items on a later test of memory. 
Although the individual may possess the metacognitive 
knowledge that people rarely remember all the items on a 
test, the sudden feeling, or metacognitive experience, that 
some items will not be remembered differs from metacognitive 
knowledge. 
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Brown {1978) also suggested that metacognition can be 
divided into two broad components: knowledge about cognition 
and regulation of cognition. Knowledge about cognition is 
synonymous with Flavell's {1979) metacognitive knowledge. 
Regulation of cognition, however, includes more than is 
defined in the term metacognitive experience. Metacognitive 
experiences are specific moments of insight, whereas 
regulation of control is thought to be integral to cognition 
in general. Regulation of control refers to the planning, 
monitoring, and checking of cognition {Brown & Palinscar, 
1982). Brown suggests that knowledge about cognition and 
regulation of cognition recursively support one another, and 
that attempts to separate the two lead to oversimplification 
{Brown & Palinscar, 1982; see also, Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 
1982) . 
Nelson and Narens {1990) recently provided an overview 
of adult metamemory which focused on certain aspects of the 
regulation of memory. Memory processing generally is 
thought of in terms of the acquiring, retaining, and 
retrieving of information. Nelson and Narens {1990) refer 
to this as the object-level. They distinguish the object-
level from a second level of memory processing, the meta-
level, which they refer to as a dynamic model of the object-
level. Less abstractly, the meta-level can be thought of as 
metacognitive knowledge pertaining to the acquiring, 
retaining, and retrieving of information. 
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Nelson and Narens (1990) suggest that the object-level 
and the meta-level interact with each other through two 
processes: monitoring and control. Monitoring refers to an 
individual's ability to tap into the state of the object-
level, and control refers to any attempt by an individual to 
influence the object-level. Figure 1 provides a way to 
organize the interaction of the meta-level with the object-
level. Figure 1 is not intended to be a theory of 
metacognition, but rather is intended to aid 
conceptualization and understanding of adult metamemory 
research. 
Monitoring 
Monitoring, as defined by Nelson and Narens (1990), 
consists of the meta-level being informed by the object-
level. Four measures have been used by researchers to 
investigate the monitoring of information. First, research 
has focused on ease of learning (EOL) judgments, wherein 
subjects are asked to rate how difficult a given item is to 
learn (e.g., Underwood, 1966). Second, researchers have 
asked subjects during or following study to judge whether 
they have learned a given item well enough to recall it on a 
later test; this has been termed both a judgment of knowing 
(JOK) (e.g., King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980) and a 
judgment of learning (JOL) (e.g., Leonesio & Nelson, 1990). 
Third, subjects have been asked to make feeling-of-knowing 
judgments (FOKs), which are predictions of whether a 
Figure 1 
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currently nonrecallable item will be recalled on a 
subsequent retention test, such as a recognition test (e.g., 
Hart, 1965}. Finally, researchers have examined subjects' 
confidence judgments (CJs}, wherein subjects judge the 
probability that a given answer is correct (e.g., 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1977}. Although 
considerable metamemory research has focused on FOK 
judgments and CJs, this research is only minimally related 
to the on-going study process, since both judgments are made 
following attempts to recall previously-studied items. 
Because the focus of the present study is on study time 
allocation, emphasis will be placed on research involving 
EOL judgments and JOKs, which ostensibly are pertinent to 
on-going study. 
EOL judgments are usually made prior to study; the 
defining characteristic of an EOL judgment is that the 
subject is specifically assessing the difficulty to learn a 
particular item. It has been shown that subjects are 
rather adept at predicting which items are easy and which 
items are difficult to recall (Lippman & Kintz, 1968; 
Underwood, 1966}. Underwood (1966} demonstrated that, in 
addition to being correlated with eventual recall, subjects' 
EOL judgments were substantially correlated with various 
item characteristics such as pronounceability and 
meaningfulness (cf. Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982}. Thus, it 
is plausible that EOL judgments are based primarily on item 
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characteristics. 
In addition, at least for simple to-be-learned items, 
EOL judgments do not differ substantially when subjects are 
required to make immediate decisions and when subjects are 
allowed considerable time to decide (Zechmeister & Bennett, 
1991). Thus, subjects appear to be able to process relevant 
information quickly when making EOL judgments. 
Whereas an EOL judgment focuses on an item's perceived 
difficulty, a JOK focuses on the degree to which a given 
item is known or has been learned by the subject. In this 
latter case, subjects are asked to judge the likelihood of 
recalling a studied item either during or after study, but 
before a test of memory. Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) were the 
first to demonstrate that subjects could make accurate JOKs. 
In their study, subjects learned lists of five paired-
associate items. Each pair was studied for 3 s. After all 
the pairs had been presented, one of the five items was re-
presented and subjects rated the likelihood that they would 
remember the pair. Subjects marked an "x" on a horizontal 
line containing five bars equally spaced and the phrases 
"very likely" and "very unlikely" printed on either side. 
As subjects' likelihood predictions increased so did their 
recall for all serial positions except the fifth, for which 
recall was consistently high for all ratings. Arbuckle and 
Cuddy concluded that 11 ••• Ss could reliably predict at time 
of presentation of an item whether they would recall it" (p. 
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130) . 
Researchers subsequently have identified a number of 
factors within the learning situation that allow subjects to 
make JOKs even more accurately. One factor is the presence 
of test trials. King et al. (1980) showed that accuracy of 
JOKs was considerably greater when subjects were given test 
trials during study than when subjects were not given test 
trials. Lovelace (1984) replicated this finding and further 
suggested that another factor, multiple study trials, 
enhances JOK accuracy. Prediction accuracy was shown to 
increase as the number of study trials increased, although 
the total study time remained the same. More recently, 
Nelson and Dunloskey (1991) demonstrated that JOKs made 
following a brief delay were substantially more accurate 
than JOKs made immediately after study. 
In interpreting the basis of JOK accuracy, Arbuckle and 
Cuddy (1969) suggested that their subjects relied upon the 
perceived difficulty of the items. In other words, they 
felt that JOKs were actually EOL judgments. The possibility 
that JOKs are based on the same information as EOL judgments 
was investigated by Zechmeister, Christensen, and Rajkowski 
(1980), and Leonesio and Nelson (1990). Both studies 
revealed that the two types of judgments are moderately 
correlated, although subjects' JOKs are better predictors of 
recall than subjects' EOL judgments. 
One possible explanation of the moderate correlation 
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between EOL judgments and JOKs is that EOL judgments are 
made prior to study and are based almost completely on item 
characteristics, whereas JOKs are made during· or after study 
and use item characteristics as well as information provided 
from the on-going learning process. The results of Leonesio 
and Nelson's (1990) study support this position. JOKs were 
significantly more accurate than EOL judgments when items 
were learned to a criterion of four correct recalls, but 
were not significantly more accurate when items were learned 
to a criterion of one correct recall. Apparently, increased 
study leads to greater disparity between EOL judgments and 
JOKs. 
The results of the studies by King et al. (1980), and 
Lovelace (1984) provide additional evidence that EOL 
judgments are primarily based on item characteristics and 
JOKs are based both on item characteristics and information 
from on-going study. In both studies, subjects studying 
without test trials were able to predict significantly above 
chance which items would be recalled; however, subjects 
studying with test trials predicted which items would be 
recalled substantially better. In both studies, moreover, 
subjects studying with test trials remembered which items 
were and which items were not recalled on the trial 
immediately preceding the prediction trial, and apparently 
used this information as a basis for their prediction. 
These results are consistent with those of Gardiner and Klee 
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(1976), who demonstrated that subjects can accurately 
recognize which items were recalled and which items were not 
recalled on a previous study trial. Shaughnessy (1981) 
interpreted the findings of King et al. (1980) as suggesting 
that in the absence of retrieval attempts prior to 
prediction, the most probable basis for JOK accuracy is 
perceived item difficulty. 
A final study which has investigated the role of item 
characteristics in predictive accuracy was conducted by 
Cohen (1988). He examined the accuracy of subjects' JOKs 
for nonverbal items. Subjects were presented with a list of 
words or a list of subject-performed tasks (SPTs) . An 
example of a SPT would be picking up a toothpick and 
breaking it. In one experiment, the items were presented 
either once or twice. Subjects recalled comparable amounts 
of words and SPTs, and recalled more twice-presented items 
than once-presented items. For both words and SPTs, 
subjects were able to predict that twice-presented items 
would be better recalled than once-presented items. 
Subjects were also able to predict reliably which words 
would and would not be recalled; however, they were 
completely incapable of predicting which SPTs would and 
would not be recalled. One interpretation of these results 
is that subjects can effectively monitor on-going study 
(once-presented or twice-presented items) regardless of the 
type of item, and subjects can effectively use item 
characteristics of verbal items as a basis for their 
judgments, but subjects are incapable of deriving any 
meaningful predictive information from SPT item 
characteristics. Nevertheless, more research is needed to 
clearly delineate the processes underlying metacognitive 
judgments of SPTs, as well as those of verbal items. 
Control 
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It seems probable that a learner's decisions within a 
learning situation depend on his/her ability to monitor the 
learning process. The decisions that a learner makes to 
influence the learning process have been defined as control 
processes. Some concrete examples of control are: 
allocating more study time, increasing effort during study, 
terminating study, self testing, choosing a specific memory 
search, and terminating the memory search (see Figure 1) . 
A limited amount of research has focused on the 
learner's decisions to control the acquiring, retaining, or 
retrieving of information. One reason for this is that 
control processes are dependent on metacognitive knowledge, 
as well as on the immediate monitoring of information. As a 
result, it is difficult to locate those factors accounting 
for differences in control. For example, a researcher might 
hypothesize that good learners increase effort during study 
of more difficult material, whereas poor learners do not. 
If this were found to be the case, it would be unclear if 
the differential effect was due to differences in control 
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(good learners are able to increase effort whereas poor 
learners can not), monitoring (good learners are better able 
to recognize difficult material), or overall meta-level 
knowledge (good learners know that difficult material 
requires more effort whereas poor learners do not) . In this 
example it may be difficult to know exactly what is 
accounting for the increased effort on the part of the good 
learner; however, valuable information can still be gained 
from examining the entire control process. The discovery of 
overall metamemory relationships, between metamemory and 
learning ability in this example, could provide a starting 
point, which could be followed up with more analytic 
research. 
One of the earliest studies to investigate subjects' 
control of study time was conducted by Zacks {1969). She 
asked subjects to study lists of paired-associate items in 
one of two ways. Subjects studied under either the 
experimenter's control (2-s rate study/test) or under the 
subject's control of study and test trials (self-
presentation). Subjects studying under their own control 
studied difficult pairs longer than less difficult pairs. 
There was no significant difference in overall recall 
between experimenter-paced study and subject-paced study. 
Recent research has begun to focus more directly on the 
relationship of monitoring judgments and control. Nelson 
and Leonesio (1988) asked subjects to make EOL judgments 
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prior to a study trial during which subjects were allowed to 
study an item for as much time as they felt was necessary. 
Subjects were later given a cued-recall test. It was 
hypothesized that there would be an inverse relationship 
between EOL judgments and study time allocation. That is, 
items judged to be difficult to learn should be allocated 
more study time than items judged to be easy to learn. This 
was termed the "monitoring-affects-control hypothesis" (p. 
678). It was further hypothesized that the extra study time 
given to more difficult pairs would result in complete 
compensation, whereby equal amounts of easy and hard items 
would be recalled. This was termed the "complete 
compensation hypothesis" (p. 678). The monitoring-affects-
control hypothesis was in fact supported by their results, 
but the complete compensation hypothesis was not. Subjects 
did allocate more study to items judged to be more difficult 
to learn, but items judged to be more difficult were still 
recalled significantly less than items judged to be less 
difficult. Nelson and Leonesio (1988) were struck by 
subjects' inability to master every item even when study 
time was unlimited. Nelson and Narens (1990) later 
suggested, "Future research should determine whether the 
same or different results occur during multitrial 
acquisition, because people routinely learn information to 
mastery, and this needs to be reconciled with the Nelson and 
Leonesio findings" (p. 8) . 
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Mazzoni, Cornoldi, and Marchitelli (1990) investigated 
the relationship between JOKs and study time allocation. In 
one experiment, subjects were initially presented a noun 
pair for 2.5 s, 5 s, or 7.5 s, and then they were given 5 s 
to make a JOK. Following the JOK, subjects were allowed to 
restudy the pair for up to 15 s. When items were initially 
presented for 2.5 s or 5 s, items rated as most likely to be 
recalled were allocated less study time than items rated as 
least likely to be recalled; this is consistent with the 
relationship between EOL judgments and study time found by 
Nelson and Leonesio (1988) . In contrast to these results, 
when the initial presentation was 7.5 s, items which 
received a rating of 3 (5-pt scale), meaning they were 
"uncertain about subsequent recall," were allocated the most 
study time; items judged least likely to be recalled or most 
likely to be recalled were allocated roughly the same amount 
of study time. More research is needed to examine the 
various factors influencing the control of study time. 
Metamemory-Memory Relationship 
One of the main motivations for research on metamemory 
has been the theoretical conviction that there are important 
relationships between knowing about memory and memory 
performance (Schneider & Pressley, 1989). Cavanaugh and 
Perlmutter (1982), however, reported that developmental 
research has yielded only moderate or low correlations 
between metamemory and memory performance. Developmental 
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research on the metamemory-memory relationship includes 
correlations between memory performance and a variety of 
metamemory indices such as knowledge of strategy 
effectiveness, strategy use, and predictive accuracy. 
Schneider and Pressley (1989) suggested that some indices of 
metamemory appear to exhibit correlations with memory 
performance more consistently than others. For example, 
spontaneous use of study strategies, such as rehearsal, 
tends to be more consistently correlated with memory 
performance than is predictive accuracy. 
Nearly all adult metamemory studies investigating the 
memory-metamemory relationship have focused on showing a 
relationship between predictive accuracy and memory 
performance. For instance, in Lovelace's (1984) study 
subjects made JOKs for associative word pairs after one or 
multiple study presentations. For each condition, he 
correlated predictive accuracy with the total amount 
recalled. A significant correlation between predictive 
accuracy and learning ability failed to emerge in any of the 
conditions. Lovelace (1984) suggested that the 
experimenter's control over study trials may have precluded 
a relationship between memory performance and predictive 
accuracy. In other words, memory-metamemory relationships 
may be prevented if the memory prediction is not allowed to 
influence study. He suggested that a self-paced task would 
allow possible metamemory differences to influence memory 
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performance. 
More recently, Kearney and Zechmeister (1989) directly 
investigated the relationship between learning ability and 
metamemory performance. Their procedure consisted of 
administering an initial learning task, having subjects make 
EOL judgments for a second list of items, and finally having 
them study and recall this second list of items. Good and 
poor learners were distinguished based on the initial 
learning task. Despite considerable differences in learning 
ability there were no apparent differences in the predictive 
accuracy of good and poor learners. Kearney and Zechmeister 
(1989) reasoned that perhaps differences between good and 
poor learners would emerge if subjects were given an initial 
attempt to learn the items. In the second and third 
experiments of their study, subjects studied the items (2 or 
5 study trials) prior to making EOL judgments. Once again, 
subjects were able to make EOL judgments above chance, but a 
clear difference between good and poor learners' EOL 
accuracy failed to emerge. 
Maki and Swett (1987) also found no correlation between 
predictive accuracy (JOKs) and number of narrative text idea 
units recalled. In contrast, Maki and Berry (1984) found 
that subjects who scored higher than the median performance 
on a multiple-choice memory test were more accurate at 
predicting future test performance for sections of written 
text than were subjects who scored below the median. Also, 
Shaughnessy (1979) demonstrated that students who received 
higher scores on a classroom test made more accurate 
confidence judgments of whether a given test answer was 
correct. 
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In a recent developmental study by Dufresne and 
Kobasigawa (1989), the responsibility of monitoring and 
controlling the learning process was left up to the learner. 
Children (grades 1, 3, 5, and 7) were asked to study hard 
and easy items in a self-paced manner. Older children 
(grades 5 and 7) studied the hard items for more time than 
they did the easy items whereas younger children (grades 1 
and 3) did not. Although it has been suggested that 
ability-related differences are not the same as age-related 
differences (Kurtz & Weinert, 1989), a design similar to 
Dufresne and Kobasigawa's may expose metamemory differences 
related to learning ability. 
In summary, no adult studies investigating standard EOL 
judgments or JOKs have found a substantial relationship 
between predictive accuracy and learning ability. The one 
study conducted by Maki and Berry (1984) that did find a 
relationship between predictive accuracy and total amount 
recalled asked subjects to make a more complex prediction. 
Subjects were not asked to simply indicate how hard they 
felt an item was to learn or if they felt an item had been 
learned. Instead, subjects were asked to infer from a 
written paragraph whether they would be able to accurately 
19 
answer a multiple-choice test focusing on the given 
paragraph. This task may involve a more careful integration 
of the provided information than is required in standard 
predictive tasks. Perhaps differences between good and poor 
learners emerge not in the monitoring of information, but 
rather in the integration of that information with overall 
metacognitive knowledge, and in subsequent metacognitive 
decision making. 
The Present Study 
Adult metamemory research has focused primarily on 
subjects' ability to make predictions, such as how difficult 
an item is to learn (EOL judgment), or whether a given item 
has in fact been learned sufficiently well to be recalled on 
a later test (JOK) . Research of this type has proven quite 
informative; however, as mentioned above, little is known 
about how these predictions relate to the learning process. 
Moreover, research focusing on metamemory predictions has 
yet to demonstrate clearly whether prediction accuracy is 
related to learning or memory abilities. The purpose of the 
present study was to examine general issues of metamemory 
while focusing on possible relationships between learning 
ability and metamemory. This was accomplished by 
investigating a control process, namely, the allocation of 
study time. 
The general method used in the present series of 
experiments required the discrimination of good and poor 
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learners. This was done in each experiment using scores 
from an initial learning task performed prior to the main 
experimental task. Specifically, subjects first were given 
s min to study 20 paired associates, followed by a 3-min 
filler task, and a cued-recall test. The results of this 
cued-recall test served as the basis for distinguishing 
between good and poor learners following the experiment. 
After the initial task had been completed, subjects were 
asked to learn a second list of 36 word pairs, 18 difficult-
to-learn and 18 easy-to-learn pairs (cf. Underwood, 1982). 
In each experiment subjects studied the pairs using a 
computer which was programmed to provide self-paced study. 
The procedure for the critical task was as follows. 
Subjects were randomly presented each of the word pairs for 
2 s (familiarization trial), then the word pairs were 
presented for 5 s in a new random order. After each 5-s 
presentation, the subject was asked whether he\she knew the 
word pair. If the response was "yes" the word pair was 
dropped from the list. If the response was "no" the word 
pair remained in the list for further study. Number of 
study presentations before a "yes" response was an important 
dependent variable. Following study, subjects were asked to 
perform a brief filler task and then were given a cued-
recall test. Number of word pairs recalled was the second 
major dependent variable. This basic procedure allowed for 
the investigation of subjects' study time allocation as a 
function of various experimental variables, while 
simultaneously allowing the examination of possible 
study/recall differences between good and poor learners. 
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Metamemory research has provided minimal information 
about a learner's control of the learning process. Subjects 
do tend to study more difficult material longer than less 
difficult material (Zacks, 1969), and subjects' EOL 
judgments (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988) and JOKs (Mazzoni et 
al., 1990) reflect this sensitivity to item difficulty. It 
is unclear, however, what impact this differential 
allocation has on eventual recall. Furthermore, research 
investigating study time allocation (Mazzoni et al., 1990; 
Nelson & Leonesio, 1988) has not allowed subjects to study a 
given item more than once. As suggested by Nelson and 
Narens (1990), research focusing on unlimited multi-trial 
learning is needed. Finally, research is needed on how 
subjects' control of learning processes is affected by 
factors, such as test opportunities, that have been shown to 
enhance metamemory predictions. 
These general metamemory issues were addressed in the 
present series of experiments. Specifically, half of the 
pairs on the critical list had been previously shown to be 
more difficult to learn than the other half (cf. Underwood, 
1982). Consequently, the amount of study time allocated to 
hard and easy items as well as the number of hard and easy 
items eventually recalled could be easily tabulated. It was 
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expected that hard items would be studied more than easy 
items; of interest was whether this differential study time 
allocation would compensate for inherent item difficulty, 
allowing roughly equivalent recall between easy and hard 
items. In addition, factors known to enhance JOKs, such as 
test trials (Exp. 2) and delay (Exp. 3), were manipulated to 
see if they would enhance the allocation of study time and 
influence later recall. 
The primary focus of the present study, however, was on 
the relationship of metamemory and learning ability. As was 
pointed out, adult metamemory research has provided meager 
evidence of a relationship between metamemory and learning 
ability. One reason that has been suggested for the lack of 
a relationship is that learning is often experimenter-
controlled (Lovelace, 1984). In these situations, 
metamemory predictions can have little effect on study time 
allocation and, consequently, no indirect effect on recall. 
One solution is to allow subjects to regulate their own 
study (self-paced study). This was the approach taken in 
the present study. 
A second reason that metamemory differences between 
good and poor learners may not have emerged is that 
metamemory research has focused primarily on predictive 
accuracy, which usually measures the ability to make 
relative judgments between the items. Perhaps both good and 
poor learners can make relative distinctions between which 
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items are more difficult or which items are better known 
(see Kearney & Zechmeister, 1989), but only better learners 
can effectively integrate these judgments with metamemory 
knowledge obtained during attempts to control learning. If 
this were the case, a relationship between learning ability 
and metamemory, which was absent for metamemory predictions, 
would emerge when control processes were investigated. 
In the first experiment of the present study, possible 
differences between good and poor learners were investigated 
by examining the allocation of study time for hard and easy 
items, and the sufficiency of study as indicated by recall. 
Possible differences between good and poor learners were 
further investigated by examining the relative benefit on 
metamemory decisions of factors such as test trials (Exp. 2) 
and delay (Exp. 3) . It was expected that good learners and 
poor learners would benefit differently. Thus, the present 
study provided a sensitive test of whether good and poor 
learners differ in their metamemory decision making. 
Method 
Subjects 
CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Forty-one introductory psychology students enrolled at 
Loyola University Chicago participated in the experiment. 
Each received course credit for participating. 
Materials 
Subjects were tested using an IBM-compatible computer. 
Two lists of paired associates were used. List 1 consisted 
of 20 word pairs of moderate difficulty according to 
Underwood's (1982) norms. The second list consisted of 18 
pairs of high difficulty and 18 pairs of low difficulty. 
All words were five letters in length and each pair 
consisted of an uncommon word as the left-hand member and a 
fairly common word as the right-hand member. Sample pairs 
are: totem-wives, lares-black, and fugue-fifty. 
Procedure 
All subjects were given a stack of flash cards, each 
containing one of 20 associative word pairs that comprised 
List 1. They were given 5 min to study the word pairs and 
were informed that they would be given a cued-recall test 
following study and a brief delay. This provided a-means to 
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discriminate good and poor associative learners as well as a 
warm-up to the main experimental task. A 3-min filler task 
(math problems} was given following study and before the 
cued-recall test. 
Following the cued-recall test on List 1, each subject 
was introduced to the main task using a brief computer-
presented sample list. List 2 learning did not begin until 
subjects reported understanding the task. Subjects studied 
the second list of associative word pairs using a procedure 
identical to that used for the sample list, except that new 
items were used. All word pairs were initially presented 
for 2 s, one item above the other. Thereafter, each pair 
was presented on the screen (one over the other} for 5 s, 
followed by a 3-s period in which only a prompt was on the 
screen which read, "Do you know the word pair? (Yes = 
terminate study, No= continue study}". If subjects 
responded "yes" by striking a specified computer key, the 
word pair was dropped from the study list. If subjects 
responded "no", the word pair was retained for further 
study. The next word pair was presented inunediately 
following the subject's response. If a response was not 
made during the 3-s period the word pair was kept in the 
list for further study. The word pairs continued to be 
presented for study until each word pair had been dropped 
from the study list. Once again a 3-min filler task (math 
problems} was administered after study, and was followed by 
a written cued-recall test. 
Results and Discussion 
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Good and poor learners were distinguished on the basis 
of List 1 recall via a median split. Mean proportion 
recalled was .83 for good learners and .33 for poor 
learners. One subject was randomly dropped to attain an 
equal number <n = 20) of subjects in each group. A 2 (good 
vs. poor learner) x 2 (easy vs. hard item) mixed design 
ANOVA was used to analyze number of study presentations 
allocated for List 2 as well as amount recalled. An alpha 
level of .OS was used for all tests. 
Mean study trials and mean proportion recall for List 2 
learning are summarized in Table 1. Subjects compensated 
for item difficulty by allocating significantly more study 
time to hard items than to easy items, E(l,38) = 53.09, MSe 
= .16. Also, poor learners studied for more study trials 
than good learners (see Table 1), although the difference 
was not significant, E(l,38) = 3.03, MSe = 3.10. 
Furthermore, there was no interaction between item 
difficulty and learning ability for amount of study, E(l,38) 
< 1, MSe = .16. Table 1 reveals that good and poor learners 
compensated similarly for item difficulty; both allocated 
more study presentations to hard items. 
Easy items were recalled better than hard items, 
E(l,38) = 43.49, MSe = 2.70, and good learners recalled more 
than poor learners, E(l,38) = 11.35, MSe = 45.37. There was 
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Table l 
Hean Study Trials and Prgportion Recalled <Exp. l) 
Good Leamer PQQr Learner 
Measure Easy Items Hard Items lasy Items Bard Items 
Study 
3~25 Trials 2.55 (. 78) 3.21 (l.2) (1.3) 3.87 (l. 6) 
Proportion 
Recalled .37 ( .12) .30 ( .14) .23 ( .13) .16 ( .15) 
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no interaction between item difficulty and learning ability 
for items recalled, E(l,38) < 1, MSe = 2.70. Inspection of 
Table 1 reveals that neither good nor poor learners studied 
sufficiently; mean proportion recall ranged from .16 to .37. 
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with 
previous research (e.g., Leonesio & Nelson, 1988): Subjects 
studied the hard items more than the easy items, but the 
easy items were recalled better than the hard items even 
when multiple study trials were available. Although good 
and poor learners exhibited similar compensatory study 
strategies, neither group compensated sufficiently. Easy 
items were still recalled more than hard items, and even in 
the best condition, when good learners studied easy items, 
only about one-third of the word pairs were successfully 
recalled. When study time was unlimited, subjects 
terminated study prior to learning even half of the items. 
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of the first experiment revealed that even 
though subjects compensated for item difficulty by studying 
hard items more than easy items, hard items were still 
recalled less than easy items, and overall recall was poor. 
More importantly, no significant study differences emerged 
between good and poor learners, despite markedly disparate 
learning ability as indicated by both initial and final 
recall. In the second experiment, the presence of test 
trials during study was manipulated to examine the effect of 
testing upon metamemory decision making. Previous research 
shows that test trials can improve JOKs (King et al., 1980). 
Thus, a relationship between testing (presence and absence) 
and decisions to terminate study was expected. 
There are at least two plausible explanations for why 
test trials enhance predictive accuracy. The most 
parsimonious explanation is that test trials provide direct 
information concerning the state of the memory trace. In 
other words, performance on a test trial provides an 
indication of whether in fact an item has been learned. 
There is evidence that recall on a trial immediately 
preceding the prediction trial is used by subjects .when 
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making JOKs in a multi-trial learning task (King et al., 
1980; Lovelace, 1984). A second viable explanation is that 
learners are consistently overconfident when making 
metamemory predictions (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic, & 
Lichtenstein, 1977) and test trials improve recall (e.g., 
Runquist, 1986), thus providing closer approximation to the 
inflated estimates. However, Shaughnessy and Zechmeister 
(1992) recently demonstrated that test trials improved 
predictive accuracy (JOKs) when the overall amount of recall 
was controlled. Therefore, the second explanation alone 
cannot account for the improvement in JOK predictive 
accuracy. 
In the second experiment, test trials were provided 
during study via an anticipation procedure. This procedure 
was expected to improve recall indirectly by improving 
metamemory decision making. Moreover, possible 
relationships between metamemory and learning ability were 
further explored by examining the benefit of test trials. 
It was of interest whether test trials are differentially 
effective for subjects of different ability. That is, do 
good and poor learners benefit similarly from test trials? 
The second experiment addressed this question by examining 
possible differences in allocating study time between good 
and poor learners with or without test trials. 
Method 
Subiects 
Sixty-four undergraduates from Loyola University 
Chicago participated in the second experiment. No subject 
had participated in the first experiment, and all subjects 
received course credit for their participation in the 
experiment. 
Materials and Procedure 
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The materials and procedures were essentially the same 
as in Experiment 1. There were two notable changes, 
however. First, minor adjustments were made in the 
instructions given to subjects. Subjects were (a) told that 
they would have to remain for the entire experimental 
period, regardless of when the learning task was completed, 
and (b) it was stressed to subjects that they were being 
asked to attempt a very difficult task that would require 
their full attention. These adjustments were made to help 
prevent possible effects of low motivation. The second 
notable change from Experiment 1 was the inclusion of a 
second study condition, the "test" condition. In the test 
condition, following the familiarization trial, subjects 
were presented the second list of word pairs in a random 
order. Each presentation consisted of a 2.5-s period, 
during which the first word of the word pair was presented 
alone, followed by a 2.5-s period, during which both words 
of the pair were present. Thus, each presentation was 5 s 
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long, but divided into two 2.5-s periods. Following the 
study presentation, subjects were prompted as to whether 
they knew the word pair. The prompt was identical to that 
of Experiment 1, and was presented for a maximum of 3 s. If 
subjects responded "yes" during the prompt, the word pair 
was dropped from the list for further study. If subjects 
responded "no", the word pair remained in the list for 
further study. Inunediately following a response, the next 
word pair was presented. As in Experiment 1, the word pairs 
continued to be presented until the subject responded "yes" 
for each word pair. Subjects were then given a 3-min 
distractor (math problems) followed by a written cued-recall 
test. Thus, there were two presentation conditions: test 
and no-test. The no-test condition was identical to 
Experiment 1 except for the instructional changes and 
differed from the test condition only in the method of 
presenting items for study. 
Results and Discussion 
The allocation of study during the second learning 
task, as well as the number of items recalled, were analyzed 
using a 2 (good vs. poor learner) X 2 (test vs. no-test 
study) X 2 (easy vs. hard item) mixed ANOVA design. Good 
and poor learners were distinguished on the basis of two 
median splits of List 1 recall. One median split was 
performed for the no-test condition, and one was performed 
for the test condition. Mean proportion recalled for good 
learners in the no-test condition was .82, and was .73 in 
the test condition; whereas mean proportions for poor 
learners were .30 and .23, respectively. The difference 
between good learners, t(30) = 1.66, as well as the 
difference between poor learners, h(30) = .74, was not 
significant at the ~ < .05 level. 
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Mean study trials and mean proportion recall for List 2 
learning are summarized in Table 2. Overall, hard items 
were allocated more study presentations than easy items, 
E(l,60) = 128.36, MSe = .18, and subjects in the test 
condition allocated more study presentations than subjects 
in the no-test condition, E(l,60) = 7.13, MSe = 5.52. 
Although poor learners allocated more study presentations 
than good learners, the difference was not significant, 
E(l,60) = 2.53, MSe = 5.52 (see Table 2). The three-way 
interaction of learning ability with item difficulty and 
testing was not significant, E(l,60) = 2.45, MSe = .18. 
Likewise, the two-way interactions of learning ability with 
item difficulty, E(l,60) = 1.31, MSe = .18, and learning 
ability with testing, E(l,60) < 1, MSe = 5.52, were not 
significant. 
Testing did interact with item difficulty, E(l,60) = 
9.29, MSe = .18. Figure 2 reveals that hard items were 
studied longer than easy items in both the test and no-test 
conditions; however, the magnitude of this difference was 
greater in the test condition. In other words, subjects 
~· 
t 
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Table 2 
Mean Stu<Sy Trials And Pro.portion Recalled <EXP. 2) 
Good Leamer Poor Learner 
Measure Easy Items Bard Items Easy Items Hard Items 
NO-TEST CONDITION 
Study 
Trials 2.82 (1.1) 3.48 (1.3) 3.31 (2. 2) .3. 89 (2 I 3) 
Proportion 
Recalled .72 (. 30) .59 (. 33) .46 { .25) .28 ( .20) 
TEST CONDITION 
Study 
Trials 3.61 (. 89) 4.50 (1.3) 4.28 (1.6) 5.57 (2 .1) 
Proportion 
Recalled .es ( .17) .80 ( .21) .58 (. 30) .46 ( .28) 
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exhibited greater compensation for item difficulty when 
provided feedback through testing. Examination of each of 
the simple effects reveals that both main effects hold 
across each level of the other variable. Hard items were 
studied longer than easy items both with testing, £(1,31) = 
73.41, MSe = .23, and without testing, £(1,31) = 52.83, MSe 
= .12, and items were studied longer with testing for both 
easy items, E(l,62) = 5.20, MSe = 2.38, and hard items, 
E(l,62) = 8.44, MSe = 3.39. 
Easy items were recalled more than hard items, E(l,60) 
= 60.34, MSe = 2.54, subjects in the test condition recalled 
more than subjects in the no-test condition, £(1,60) = 6.15, 
MSe = 41.15, and good learners recalled more than poor 
learners, £(1,60) = 21.9, MSe = 41.15. The three-way 
interaction of item difficulty, testing, and learner was not 
significant, £(1,60) < 1, MSe = 2.54, and the two-way 
interaction of learner with testing was not significant, 
E(l,60) < 1, MSe = 41.15. The two-way interaction of 
learner with item difficulty also was not significant, 
although it approached significance, £(1,60) = 3.15, MSe = 
2.54, ~ = .081. There was a greater difference between 
recall of hard and easy items for poor learners. 
The interaction of testing with item difficulty was 
significant, £(1,60) = 4.93, MSe = 2.54. While the 
difference between hard and easy items was greater in the 
test condition for study trials, the reverse was true for 
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recall (see Figure 3). Simple effects analyses revealed 
that easy items were recalled significantly more than hard 
items both with testing, E(l,31) = 19.5, MSe = 2.00, and 
without testing, E(l,31) = 39.90, MSe = 3.17. As seen in 
Figure 3, the difference was greater in the no-test 
condition. Additionally, recall was significantly higher in 
the test condition for hard items, E(l,62) = 6.34, MSe = 
29.80, but recall was not significantly higher in the test 
condition for easy items, E(l,62) = 2.82, MSe = 27.20. 
The results of Experiment 2 replicated and extended 
those of Experiment 1. The results of Experiment 2 further 
reveal that learners are sensitive to differences between 
hard and easy items and study accordingly. The presence of 
testing during study appeared to enhance metamemory decision 
making and to improve overall recall. This is strongly 
suggested by the complementary interactions between item 
difficulty and testing for study and recall. Learners 
compensated for item difficulty more in the test condition 
during study, and the difference between recall of hard and 
easy items was reduced in the test condition. It would 
appear that test trials aid learners' decisions regarding 
when to terminate study, just as they improve decisions 
about what will be remembered (i.e., JOKs). 
No significant differences emerged in the way good and 
poor learners allocated study time. As in Experiment 1, 
poor learners tended to study slightly (but not 
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significantly) longer than good learners, yet good learners 
recalled significantly more. Most importantly, good and 
poor learners were influenced similarly by testing. Both 
good and poor learners compensated more for item difficulty 
if provided testing during study, and both recalled hard and 
easy items more equally if provided testing. These results 
replicate and extend the paradoxical relationship found in 
Experiment 1: Despite considerable differences in initial 
and final recall, good and poor learners appear equally 
sensitive to item difficulty and benefit equally from 
testing during study. 
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In Experiment 1, both good and poor learners were able 
to distinguish between hard and easy items, and used this 
information similarly when allocating study. Experiment 2 
replicated this finding and further suggested that test 
trials during study enhance metamemory decision making and 
improve the sufficiency of study. Once again no differences 
in study were apparent between good and poor learners. 
Nelson and Dunloskey (1991) recently demonstrated that 
a delay between study and JOKs significantly improves 
predictive accuracy. They suggested that JOKs made 
inunediately following study are based on both short-term and 
long-term memory information, whereas JOKs made following a 
delay are based solely on long-term memory information and 
thus provide a more accurate indication of what will later 
be recalled. In Experiment 3, the effectiveness of a delay 
between study and the decision to terminate study was 
investigated. 
It was expected that, when compared with inunediate 
decision making, delayed decision making would enhance study 
and improve recall. As demonstrated for test trials in 
Experiment 2, it was expected that the presence of a delay 
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following study would enhance subjects' compensation for 
item difficulty during study, leading to improved recall. 
Thus, Experiment 3 was designed to further investigate the 
findings of Nelson and Dunloskey (1991), to provide 
convergent validity for the results of Experiment 2, and to 
provide another opportunity for possible differences between 
good and poor learners to emerge. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eighty introductory psychology students enrolled at 
Loyola University Chicago participated in the experiment. 
Subjects received course credit in exchange for their 
participation. No subject from either of the first two 
experiments participated. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedure were nearly identical to 
that of the first two experiments. Upon arrival subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: delay or 
no-delay. The anticipation procedure used in Experiment 2 
was not used in either of these conditions. Once again the 
same word pairs and initial screening task as the previous 
two experiments were used. The no-delay condition was 
nearly identical to the no-test condition of Experiment 2. 
In order to provide a better control for the delay 
condition, two minor changes were made. First, when 
subjects were prompted as to whether they knew a given word 
pair, the first word of the word pair remained on the 
screen. Second, subjects were given a maximum of 8 s as 
opposed to 3 s to decide whether they knew the word pair. 
As in the first two experiments, once subjects responded 
"yes" or "no" the next word pair was presented for study. 
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The only difference between the delay condition and the 
no-delay condition was the timing of the decision period. 
Unlike the previous experiments, subjects were not prompted 
as to whether they knew each pair until after studying all 
the pairs. That is, subjects were first presented each of 
the word pairs for 5 s and then, on a subsequent trial, were 
presented the first word of each pair along with the prompt, 
"Do you know the word pair? (Yes = terminate study, No = 
continue study)". The decision presentations were 
administered in the same order as the study presentations, 
and subjects had a maximum of 8 s in which to decide. Once 
a decision was made the next cue was presented and the 
subject then had 8 s to decide whether that pair had been 
learned. If a subject pressed the key marked "yes" the word 
pair was dropped from the study list. If a subject pressed 
the "no" key the word pair remained in the list for further 
study. Word pairs not dropped out were re-presented in a 
new random order; study presentations always preceded the 
decision presentations. This continued until all word pairs 
had been dropped out. 
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Results and Discussion 
As before, two main dependent variables, number of 
study presentations allocated and number of words recalled 
on the second cued-recall test, were analyzed. A 2 (good 
vs. poor learner) X 2 (delay vs. no-delay) X 2 (easy vs. 
hard item) mixed ANOVA design was used to analyze each 
dependent variable. Again, good and poor learners were 
distinguished on the basis of the first cued-recall test. 
Separate median splits were performed for both conditions; 
subjects in the top half were defined as good learners and 
subjects in the bottom half were defined as poor learners. 
Mean proportions were .74 (good learner) and .34 (poor 
learner) in the delay condition, and .73 (good learner) and 
.29 (poor learner) in the no-delay condition. The 
differences between good learners, ~(38) = .28, and between 
poor learners, ~(38) = 1.24, were not significant at ~ < 
.05. 
Mean study trials and mean proportion recall for List 2 
learning are summarized in Table 3. Analysis of the number 
of study presentations allocated revealed a significant main 
effect for item difficulty, E(l,76) = 143.13, MSe = .22, but 
no significant main effects for delay, E(l,76) < 1, MSe = 
4.05, or learner, E(l,76) = 3.9, MSe = 4.05, ~ = .052. 
Similar to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, hard items were 
studied longer than easy items, and poor learners studied 
longer than good learners, although this latter difference 
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Table 3 
Mean Study Trials and Pro.portion Recalled CBXP. 3) 
Good Learner Poor Learner 
M@asure Basy Items Bard Items Easy Items · Bard Items 
NO-DELAY CONDITION 
Study 
Trials 3.10 (1.3) 3.69 (1.9) 3.35 (1.4) . 4.09 (1.6) 
Proportion 
Recalled .74 (.22) .61 (.30) .39 ( .26) .26 ( .22) 
DELAY CONDITION 
Study 
Trials 2.75 (.97) 3.65 (1.4) 3.47 (1.2) 4.90 (1.9) 
Proportion 
Recalled .89 (.12) .80 (.16) .60 (.20) .43 (.19) 
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was not significant (see Table 3). The three way 
interaction of item difficulty, delay, and learner was not 
significant, £{1,76) < 1, MSe = .22. Also, the two-way 
interactions of learner and delay, £{1,76) < 1, MSe = 4.05, 
as well as learner and item difficulty, £{1,76) = 3.65, MSe 
= .22, R = .06, were not significant, although the 
interaction of learner and item difficulty approached 
significance. The difference between easy and hard items 
was greater for poor learners. The interaction of item 
difficulty and delay was significant, £{1,76) = 9.07, MSe 
.22. Simple effect analyses revealed that hard items were 
studied significantly more than easy items for both the 
delay condition, £{1,39) = 91.63, MSe = .27, and the no-
delay condition, £{1,39) = 47.6, MSe = .19, with the 
difference being greater in the delay condition (see Figure 
4) • 
Examination of the number of items recalled on the 
second cued-recall test revealed that easy items were 
recalled significantly more than hard items, £{1,76) = 
80.00, MSe = 2.95, good learners recalled significantly more 
than poor learners, £{1,76) = 54.97, MSe = 26.5, and 
subjects in the delay condition recalled significantly more 
than subjects in the no-delay condition, £(1,76) = 14.8, MSe 
= 26.5. There was no interaction between learner, item 
difficulty, and delay £(1,76) = 2.9, MSe = 2.95, R = .093. 
There were also no significant interactions between 
Figure 4 
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learner and delay, E(l,76) < 1, MSe = 26.5, learner and item 
difficulty, E(l,76) = 3.22, MSe = 2.95, R = .077, and delay 
and item difficulty, E(l,76) < 1, MSe = 2.95. Although none 
of these interactions was significant at the R < .05 level, 
the two-way interaction of learner and item difficulty, as 
well as the three-way interaction of learner, item 
difficulty and delay did approach significance. The 
disparity between the number of easy and hard items recalled 
tended to be less for good learners, and this difference was 
accentuated in the delay condition. 
The results of Experiment 3 are generally consistent 
with those of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. A delay 
between study and decision led to significantly greater 
compensation for item difficulty during study, as well as 
better recall. Interestingly, subjects in the delay 
condition did not study items significantly longer; yet, 
subjects in the delay condition recalled significantly more 
items. Although this finding appears to be inconsistent 
with the results of Experiment 2, it must be remembered that 
actual study time was not equivalent for the test (2.5-s 
test/2.5-s study) and no-test conditions (5-s study) of 
Experiment 2. The only notable inconsistency between 
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was the presence of a recall 
interaction between testing and item difficulty in 
Experiment 2, and the absence of a recall interaction 
between delay and item difficulty in Experiment 3. 
Nonetheless, in both experiments, type of study interacted 
with item difficulty for study, and in both experiments 
recall was substantially greater for the test and delay 
conditions as compared with the no-test and no-delay 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The combined results of the three experiments provide 
important information about adult metamemory. These results 
will be interpreted first in relation to general metamemory 
issues, and second, in relation to possible interactions of 
metamemory abilities and learning abilities. 
General Metamemory 
Adult metamemory research generally has focused on 
examining the learner's sensitivity to information 
influencing the learning process. For example, studies 
using EOL judgments have examined subjects' sensitivity to 
item difficulty (e.g., Kearney & Zechmeister, 1989), and 
studies using JOKs have examined subjects' sensitivity to 
what has been learned (e.g., King et al., 1980). More 
recently, metamemory researchers have begun to focus on how 
this sensitivity to learning-relevant information relates to 
subjects' control of the learning process (Nelson & Narens, 
1990). This shift in focus has led metamemory researchers 
to consider the sufficiency of the learner's control. In 
examining subjects' control of study time, for instance, 
researchers have emphasized the amount recalled in a self-
paced learning situation (e.g., Leonesio & Nelson, 1988); if 
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subjects are given unlimited study time and do not attain 
nearly perfect recall, it is considered a metamemory 
failure. The results of the present study, also, can be 
interpreted in regard to the subjects' sufficiency of study, 
as well as to subject's sensitivity to item difficulty. 
In Experiment 1, subjects allocated significantly more 
study trials to hard items than to easy items. This finding 
is consistent with previous research demonstrating that 
subjects are sensitive to item difficulty when making 
metamemory decisions in a self-paced learning task (Zacks, 
1969). Hard items, nevertheless, were still recalled less 
than easy items despite subjects' compensation during study. 
This finding, also, is consistent with previous research 
suggesting that subjects do not compensate sufficiently for 
item difficulty (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Perhaps, the 
most striking finding in Experiment 1, however, was the 
surprisingly low level of recall given that subjects had 
unlimited opportunities to study the material. As a whole, 
the results of Experiment 1 evoke a mixed impression of 
subjects' metamemory abilities. Subjects' sensitivity to 
item difficulty reflects efficient monitoring of 
information; however, subjects' failure to study items 
sufficiently, despite being allowed unlimited study 
opportunities, demonstrates unsuccessful controlling of the 
learning process. 
The results of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 suggest 
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that a lack of motivation may account somewhat for the low 
level of recall in Experiment 1. The procedures used in the 
control condition of Experiment 2 were identical to the 
procedures used in Experiment 1 except for the changes made 
to increase motivation. Although the obtained pattern of 
results was nearly identical to that of Experiment 1 (see 
Table 4), the overall level of recall was much higher in the 
control condition of Experiment 2. The same pattern of 
results, including the raised level of recall, also emerged 
for the control condition of Experiment 3. Thus, the 
findings of Experiment 1 would appear to be stable, despite 
overall recall being somewhat diminished by motivational 
factors. It should be noted, however, that recall in the 
control conditions of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 was 
still far from perfect; mean proportion recall ranged from 
.74 to .26 across both experiments. 
Of greatest importance to our understanding of 
metamemory in general, is the relative influence of the test 
manipulation, as well as that of the delay manipulation. 
Previous research has demonstrated that the presence of test 
trials during study significantly improves JOK predictive 
accuracy (King et al., 1980; Lovelace, 1984). In Experiment 
2, subjects who were given test opportunities during study 
compensated significantly more for item difficulty than 
subjects who were not given test trials. That is, subjects 
in the test condition studied hard items longer than easy 
Table 4 
Comparison of Results Across Experiments 
Stu~ &e~all 
B2Q;le:ti~nt ~an 12ift:. Rz Mean 12it:f. &2 
bp. 
bp. 
Bzp. 
• 
1 
Item Difficulty .36 • .058 .07 • 
• Type Of Learner .34 .067 .14 
Item by Learner .04 .oo 
2 
• • Item Difficulty .62 .030 .16 
Type of Learner .45 • 29 • 
Item by Learner .06 .06 
3 
Item Difficulty • • .69 .047 .13 
• Type of Learner .32 • 35 
Item by Learner .15 .oo 
Indicates difference was significant (R < .OS) 
Indicates there was no systematic variation 
.048 
.209 
.064 
.208 
.044 
.323 
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items to a greater extent than did subjects in the no-test 
condition. Moreover, subjects in the test condition 
recalled significantly more items than did subjects in the 
no-test condition. Apparently, the presence of test trials 
increased subjects' sensitivity to item difficulty and 
improved the sufficiency of their study. 
It has also been demonstrated that a delay between 
study and prediction improves subjects' JOK accuracy (Nelson 
& Dunloskey, 1991). In Experiment 3, subjects in the delay 
condition compensated for item difficulty significantly more 
than did subjects in the no-delay condition. It was also 
found that subjects in the delay condition recalled 
significantly more items than did subjects in the no-delay 
condition. It appears as if a delay between study and 
decision increased subjects' sensitivity to item difficulty 
and enhanced the sufficiency of their study, as was 
demonstrated for test trials. 
On the surface, it seems as if test opportunities, as 
well as delayed decision making, assist one's metamemory 
abilities and consequently improve recall. Although this 
may be the case, these findings must be examined further 
prior to making such a conclusion. It seems plausible that 
increased sensitivity to item difficulty should improve 
recall, and Experiment 2 provides evidence to support this 
claim. The presence of test opportunities significantly 
interacted with item difficulty; subjects in the test 
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condition studied hard items more than easy items to a 
greater extent than did subjects in the no-test condition. 
A complementary interaction between testing and item 
difficulty was also found for recall: The recall difference 
between hard and easy items was less in the test condition 
than in the no-test condition. These results would seem to 
converge in support of the intuitive assumption that 
improving metamemory performance results in improved memory 
performance. 
In Experiment 3, subjects in the delay condition 
compensated significantly more for item difficulty than did 
subjects in the no-delay condition. Surprisingly, however, 
a complementary interaction between delay and item 
difficulty was not found for recall; the recall difference 
between hard and easy items was the same for subjects in the 
delay and no-delay condition. The fact that recall was 
substantially improved in the delay condition, despite there 
being no evident benefit of differential study, raises the 
question: What is accounting for higher recall in the delay 
condition? 
As mentioned in the introduction to Experiment 2, prior 
research has demonstrated that attempts to retrieve a given 
item directly facilitate retrieval of that item (Runquist, 
1986) . Subjects in the test condition of Experiment 2 most 
probably benefitted similarly from retrieval opportunities, 
although it is impossible to tease this effect out since the 
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number of study trials was significantly greater for 
subjects in the test condition. Nelson and Dunloskey (1991) 
suggested that subjects in their study may have attempted to 
retrieve the second half of a paired-associate item when 
asked to make a delayed JOK. Similarly, subjects in the 
delay condition of Experiment 3 may have attempted to 
retrieve the second half of each paired-associate item when 
making their decision to terminate or continue study. 
Furthermore, the number of study trials was not 
significantly greater for subjects in the delay condition of 
Experiment 3, as compared with subjects in the no-delay 
condition. (There was also no significant study interaction 
between learning ability and delay.) Thus, if subjects did 
not study longer in the delay condition, and there is no 
evidence of a benefit due to increased compensation, then it 
is likely that subjects attempted retrieval during delayed 
decision making which, in turn, facilitated recall. 
Clearly, more analytical research is needed on the processes 
involved in delayed metamemory decisions. 
In summary, the results of the present series of 
experiments can be interpreted in terms of subjects' 
sensitivity to item difficulty and their sufficiency of 
study. Both testing and delay enhanced metamemory decision 
making and improved recall. It remains unresolved, however, 
whether greater compensation for item difficulty is directly 
related to higher recall. It is interesting that factors 
such as testing and delay may improve recall both by 
enhancing metamemory decision making and by directly 
improving the quality of study. This finding has 
implications for planning effective learning in general. 
Metamemory and Learning Ability 
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Previous metamemory research had suggested that there 
were no substantial correlations between learning ability 
and the ability to make metamemory predictions when the 
learning task used simple verbal items (e.g., Kearney & 
Zechmeister, 1989). It was reasoned that perhaps good and 
poor learners are similar in their ability to monitor which 
items are harder to recall or which items have been learned, 
but differ in their ability to integrate those judgments 
with past knowledge and thus make appropriate decisions 
during learning. 
In the present study, the control of study time 
allocation by good and poor learners was investigated. It 
was hypothesized that good learners study more effectively 
than poor learners. Experiment 1, however, failed to show 
any differences in study allocation between good and poor 
learners. Both good and poor learners studied hard items 
more than easy items and recalled more easy items than hard 
items. This finding was replicated in the control 
conditions of Experiment 2 and 3 (see Table 4) . These 
results were obtained despite sizable differences in initial 
recall between good and poor learners as demonstrated on the 
57 
pretest. 
In Experiments 2 and 3, factors previously shown to 
benefit metamemory predictions were investigated to see if 
they had a similar effect on good and poor learners' 
decisions to terminate study. As mentioned above, these 
factors enhanced metamemory decision making and improved 
recall. Once again, no differences were apparent between 
good and poor learners. Good and poor learners alike 
compensated for item difficulty more in the test or delay 
conditions as compared with their respective control 
conditions. Furthermore, good and poor learners benefitted 
similarly from testing and delay. Overall, no significant 
differences emerged between good and poor learners in any 
study condition within the three experiments. The fact that 
learners who differ widely in learning ability are equally 
sensitive to differences in item difficulty, and benefit 
similarly from testing and delayed decision making, provides 
a paradox in adult metamemory research. Although effective 
regulation of study would seem to be paramount to one's 
ability to learn, no relationship emerged between learning 
ability and control of study. 
When studies of adult metamemory first failed to find 
correlations between metamemory performance and learning 
ability, researchers found the results surprising and 
counterintuitive (e.g., Lovelace, 1984). When additional 
studies using different item types showed similar results, 
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the lack of a relationship became more perplexing (e.g., 
Maki & Swett, 1987). Now that studies focusing directly on 
the relationship between metamemory and learning ability 
have also failed to find any relationship (Kearney & 
Zechmeister, 1989; present study), it is time to confront 
the question of why there may be no metamemory differences 
between good and poor learners in simple learning tasks. 
Brown (1978) has suggested that " ... in the domain of 
deliberate learning and problem-solving, conscious executive 
control of the routines available to the system is the 
essence of intelligent activity" (p.79). Why has adult 
metamemory research provided little support for this belief? 
One possible reason for this paradox is that the 
ability to learn a list of items is not, in fact, correlated 
with intelligent study activity. This seems unlikely in the 
case of multi-trial, self-paced learning with highly 
heterogeneous items. It is possible, however, that the 
learning tasks used to date do not place sufficient demand 
on metamemory skills. One solution is to increase task 
complexity. Clever research using more complex learning 
tasks may be necessary to resolve the present learning 
ability paradox in adult metamemory research. 
Although the simplicity of the task may account for the 
lack of general relationships between metamemory and 
learning abilities, this explanation provides little insight 
into why good and poor learners benefit similarly from 
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testing and delay. Brown and Palinscar (1982) revived 
Piaget's distinction between " .. active regulation as part of 
any knowing act, and conscious regulation and direction of 
thought, the keystone of formal operations" (p. 2). They 
went on to say that young children are very capable of 
regulating their activities and that some form of error 
correction is part of all active learning. What younger 
children, and perhaps poorer learners, are incapable of 
doing is reflecting back on their own thought or learning 
and using this conceptualization to initiate more complex 
cognitive strategies (Brown & Palinscar, 1982). 
Accordingly, good and poor learners in the present study may 
have been equally capable of using corrective information 
from testing and delay, but if asked to reflect upon and 
design their own method of optimizing study, perhaps good 
learners would study more effectively. 
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